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Previous research has shown that people differ in their implicit theories about the essential
characteristics of intelligence and emotions. Some people believe these characteristics
to be predetermined and immutable (entity theorists), whereas others believe that these
characteristics can be changed through learning and behavior training (incremental
theorists). The present study provides evidence that in healthy adults (N = 688), implicit
beliefs about emotions and emotional intelligence (EI) may influence performance on the
ability-based Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). Adults in our
sample with incremental theories about emotions and EI scored higher on the MSCEIT
than entity theorists, with implicit theories about EI showing a stronger relationship to
scores than theories about emotions. Although our participants perceived both emotion
and EI as malleable, they viewed emotions as more malleable than EI. Women and young
adults in general were more likely to be incremental theorists than men and older adults.
Furthermore, we found that emotion and EI theories mediated the relationship of gender
and age with ability EI. Our findings suggest that people’s implicit theories about EI may
influence their emotional abilities, which may have important consequences for personal
and professional EI training.
Keywords: emotional intelligence, MSCEIT, implicit theories, gender, age, mediation
Introduction
Individuals can differ substantially in how much they believe that essential human characteristics
such as intelligence and emotions are malleable. Those termed “entity theorists” regard such
attributes as relatively fixed and difficult to change; others, termed “incremental theorists,” view
the same attributes as malleable and changeable with effort and time (Dweck and Leggett, 1988).
Being an incremental theorist has been associated with different positive outcomes such as better
academic and professional achievement, and better mental health and well-being (Dweck, 2012), yet
we are unaware of studies that have analyzed how an individual’s implicit theories of emotions and
emotional intelligence (EI) influence his or her EI. The present study therefore sought to examine
how such implicit theories relate to ability EI.
Emotional Intelligence
In the quarter-century since Salovey and Mayer (1990) published the concept of EI, various
theoretical models and instruments have been developed. The most widely applied theoretical
models are mixed models and the ability model (Mayer et al., 2008). Mixed models concep-
tualize EI as a conglomeration of characteristics, including empathy, motivation, persistence,
optimism, and social skills. Mixed EI is typically measured through self-report instruments, and
it overlaps extensively with personality traits and measures of emotional/psychological well-being
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(Oconnor and Little, 2003; Grubb and McDaniel, 2007; Webb
et al., 2013). The ability model, in contrast, defines EI as the
integration of several capacities: “the ability to perceive accu-
rately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or
generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to under-
stand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to reg-
ulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth”
(Mayer and Salovey, 1997). Ability EI is assessed in adults using
the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT;
Mayer et al., 2002), which assesses each of the four abilities
(“branches”) of perceiving, facilitating, understanding, and man-
aging emotions (Mayer et al., 2003). MSCEIT scores show a
positive relationship with various domains of daily life, including
mental and physical health, social functioning, and academic and
workplace performance (e.g., Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Daus
and Ashkanasy, 2005; Mayer et al., 2008; Brackett et al., 2011;
O’Boyle et al., 2011).
Ability EI appears to vary significantly with gender. While
numerous studies of ability EI using such instruments as the
MSCEIT have reported women to perform significantly better
than men (e.g., Mayer et al., 1999; Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Brackett
and Mayer, 2003; Palmer et al., 2005; Extremera et al., 2006;
Goldenberg et al., 2006; Farrelly and Austin, 2007; McIntyre,
2010), the effect size of gender varies substantially. Some stud-
ies have reported small gender differences (e.g., Lumley et al.,
2005; Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2012), while others have reported
medium differences (e.g., Palmer et al., 2005; Farrelly and Austin,
2007). A meta-analysis of ability EI concluded the effect size to be
0.47 (Joseph and Newman, 2010).
Ability EI may also vary with age, but here the literature is less
clear. While some studies reported significantly higher ability EI
in older adults (Mayer et al., 1999), other studies have found no
significant association between age and ability EI (Farrelly and
Austin, 2007; Webb et al., 2013). Part of this discrepancy may
arise from the fact that most studies on this question examine
a relatively narrow age range in university populations, with all
participants younger than 30 years. One study examining sub-
jects ranging from 18 to 76 years old reported a small negative
association between age and ability IE (Cabello et al., 2014).
Implicit Theories
Implicit theories function like knowledge structures (Chiu et al.,
1997; Plaks et al., 2009), through which people interpret them-
selves and others; individuals generally act in accordance with
these theories (Dweck, 2012; Leith et al., 2014). Thus, implicit
theories profoundly affect human behavior, and understanding
natural variation in those theories may help predict how people
will respond to particular stimuli, psychotherapy, or behavioral
training. For example, individuals can hold different implicit
theories about the malleability of various cognitive, emotional,
and behavioral domains of human nature (Dweck et al., 1995a).
These domains include intelligence, emotion, social skills, rela-
tionships, management skills, social judgment, and stereotyping
(for a review, see Dweck, 2012). So-called entity theorists consider
these domains as relatively fixed and difficult to change. In con-
trast, incremental theorists view these same attributes asmalleable
and changeable with effort and time (Dweck and Leggett, 1988).
Implicit theories of intelligence appear to be significant deter-
minants of human psychology and behavior. Studies indicate
that individuals with incremental theories of intelligence regard
effort as positive and necessary for improving ability (Dweck and
Leggett, 1988; Blackwell et al., 2007), and such people tend to
set themselves learning goals aimed at enhancing their malleable
traits (Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Robins and Pals, 2002; Mangels
et al., 2006). They tend to be more persistent and strategic than
those with entity theories of intelligence (Robins and Pals, 2002;
Blackwell et al., 2007; Nussbaum and Dweck, 2008), and they are
more likely to cultivate mastery-oriented strategies to overcome
developmental challenges such as the start of adolescence and the
transition from primary school to secondary school (Blackwell
et al., 2007).
Implicit theories of emotions also strongly affect human psy-
chology and behavior. Several studies with university students or
adults have shown that compared to those holding entity theories
about the malleability of emotions, those holding incremental
theoriesmore frequently use cognitive reappraisal as an emotional
regulation strategy, experience more positive and fewer negative
emotions, receive greater social support, are more likely to use
mastery-oriented strategies rather than helpless strategies, and
harbor higher expectations of success (Tamir et al., 2007; Burnette
et al., 2013; De Castella et al., 2013).
Schumann et al. (2014) reported that people’s beliefs about
empathy are positively associated with empathic concern (Study
1, r = 0.21), based on a measure of dispositional tendencies to
feel empathy for others in everyday life. In fact, data from that
study suggest that empathic behavior is more strongly associ-
ated with people’s beliefs about empathy than with their self-
reported levels of empathy. This suggests that implicit theories
of empathy and self-reported levels of empathy are related but
distinct, which coincides with a meta-analysis of self-report stud-
ies (Burnette et al., 2013), indicating only a small to moderate
relationship between implicit theories and self-regulatory pro-
cesses (range, 0.15–0.24). Thus, the available evidence suggests
that people’s theories about whether or not emotional abilities
can change and be developed does not overlap with—and can be
separated from—what people self-report about their emotional
abilities.
Similarly, implicit theories of intelligence and emotions are
related but distinct; some academic and emotional outcomes are
affected by both theories, while others are affected only by one
or the other (Romero et al., 2014). In addition, several studies
with university students suggest that they view emotions as more
malleable than intelligence (Tamir et al., 2007).
Whether age and gender affect implicit theories about intel-
ligence and emotions is unclear. Some studies have failed to
show significant differences between men and women (Dweck
et al., 1995a; Tamir et al., 2007; Doron et al., 2009), and a meta-
analysis found the available evidence to be inconclusive (Burnette
et al., 2013). Similarly, while some studies have found no sig-
nificant association between age and implicit theories (Dweck
et al., 1995a), others have reported that people differentiate into
incremental and entity theorists around 13 years of age (Diseth
et al., 2014), and that older adults (ranging from 18 to 70 years)
are more likely to hold entity theories (Spinath et al., 2003).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7002
Cabello and Fernández-Berrocal Implicit theories and emotional intelligence
The Present Study
Although implicit theories have been linked with numerous
domains of human nature, we are unaware of studies exploring
possible relationships of theories about emotions or EI with ability
EI. This led to the present study with the following objectives (O)
and hypotheses (H):
O1. Examine how implicit theories of emotions and EI are related
and howmuch individuals perceive these domains to bemal-
leable.We hypothesized that emotions would be perceived as
moremalleable than EI (H1), based on previous work (Tamir
et al., 2007).
O2. Examine whether and how implicit theories of emotion and
EI are associated with ability EI. Because implicit theo-
ries have domain-specific implications (Dweck et al., 1995a;
Romero et al., 2014), we expected implicit theories of EI to
be more linked to ability EI and more predictive of ability EI
than implicit theories of emotion (H2).
O3. Examine possible effects of gender and age on implicit theo-
ries about emotions and EI.
O4. Determine whether implicit theories about emotions and EI
mediate the relationship of gender or age with ability EI.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
The sample comprised 688 healthy adults (37% men) ranging in
age from 18 to 73 years (M = 36.02, SD = 14.9). Participants
were recruited via posters on the local university campus, at
retirement homes and in local newspapers. They received no
financial compensation or incentive in exchange for participation
in the study. Participants were accepted into the study to ensure a
broad, balanced distribution of gender, age, and socio-economic
status. Volunteers were not accepted into the study if they were
younger than 18 years or if they had any physical or psycholog-
ical disability that would compromise their ability to fill out the
MSCEIT. Participants completed the questionnaires themselves
at home. Data were collected over two consecutive years with the
help of a team of research assistants. The study was carried out
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Ethics approval
was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee, University
of Málaga.
Instruments
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (Version 2.0;
Mayer et al., 2002; Extremera and Fernández-Berrocal, 2009).
Ability EI was measured using a Spanish translation of the
MSCEIT, which shows similar psychometric properties as the
original instrument (Extremera et al., 2006); this test has been
validated for adults aged 17 and older. The MSCEIT uses two
tasks to measure each of the four branches of EI (perceiving,
facilitating, understanding, and managing emotions), comprising
a total of eight tasks. The instrument provides separate scores for
each branch as well as an overall score for total EI. Scores can be
calculated based on expert or consensus norms, which correlate
strongly with each other (r > 0.90; Mayer et al., 2003). In the
present study, we used only total EI score, which we calculated
using consensus norms. Scores computed by the test publishers
are standardized (M = 100, SD = 15), and the reliability of the
two halves is 0.93 based on the consensus criterion. The test-retest
reliability of the globalMSCEIT is 0.86 after 3 weeks (Brackett and
Mayer, 2003).
Implicit Theories of Emotion (Tamir et al., 2007). We evaluated
implicit theories about themalleability of emotions using the scale
adapted by Tamir et al. (2007) from the scale originally created
by Dweck (1999) to evaluate implicit theories about intelligence.
The scale consists of four items, two assessing incremental theories
(“Everyone can learn to control their emotions”; “If they want to,
people can change the emotions that they have”) and two assessing
entity theories (“No matter how hard they try, people can’t really
change the emotions that they have”; “The truth is, people have
very little control over their emotions”). The participants were
asked to report their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale. Entity
statements were reverse-scored such that higher scores reflected
a more incremental theory of emotions. The Spanish transla-
tion of the Implicit Theories of Emotion instrument was created
using a back-translation procedure involving two independent
translators, both of whom have PhDs in psychology and who are
experts in the topic. In the present sample, the Cronbach alpha
was 0.75.
Implicit Theories of EI. Implicit theories about the malleabil-
ity of EI were evaluated using a scale adapted by us from the
scale originally developed by Dweck (1999) to evaluate implicit
theories about intelligence. The scale comprises two statements
assessing incremental theories (“No matter how much emotional
intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit”;
“You can always significantly change how emotionally intelligent
you are”) and two assessing entity theories (“You can learn new
things, but you can’t really change your basic emotional intel-
ligence”; “Your emotional intelligence is something about you
that you can’t change very much”). Participants were asked to
report their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale. Entity statements
were reverse-scored such that higher scores reflected a more
incremental theory of emotions. The Spanish translation of the
Implicit Theories of Emotional Intelligence instrument was created
using a back-translation procedure involving two independent
translators, both of whom have PhDs in psychology and who are
experts in the topic. In the present sample, the Cronbach alpha
was 0.74.
Statistical Analysis
All statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS 20.0 (IBM,
USA). Preliminary analyses were carried out to compute descrip-
tive statistics, as well as to detect relationships among age, gen-
der, implicit theories about emotions or EI, and total ability EI
scores. To examine whether theories about emotions or about
EI explained a greater proportion of the observed variance in
ability EI, we conducted two analyses of two-step hierarchical
regression in which the predictor variables were implicit theories
of emotions or EI, while the criterion variable was total ability
EI score. To determine whether gender and age were related to
ability EI through implicit theories about emotions or EI, we used
a parallel mediation model in the PROCESS algorithm (Hayes,
2013). PROCESS is a conditional process modeling program for
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7003
Cabello and Fernández-Berrocal Implicit theories and emotional intelligence
use with SPSS that utilizes an ordinary least squares- or logistic-
based path analytical framework to test for both direct and indirect
effects (Hayes, 2013). To test the significance of a mediation
effect, PROCESS generates the Sobel test value and percentile-
based bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals (CIs) for each
indirect effect; the indirect effect is judged significant when the CI
does not contain 0 (p< 0.05).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables are
shown in Table 1. Our sample tended to view as malleable both
emotions (M = 19.69) and EI (M = 18.92; Table 1). This is
consistent with previous studies on implicit theories of emotions
(Tamir et al., 2007) and intelligence (Dweck et al., 1995a). In
addition, our subjects viewed emotions as more malleable than
EI based on a paired-samples t test [t(687) = 4.20, p < 0.0001].
This supports our hypothesis H1 and is consistent with previous
studies on implicit theories of emotions (Tamir et al., 2007) and
intelligence (Dweck et al., 1995a).
Implicit theories of emotions and EI significantly and positively
correlated with each other with a medium effect size (r = 0.43,
p < 0.01). Thus, both types of theory were related but distinct
and separable in our study. We performed all subsequent analyses
using both implicit theories.
Implicit Theories of Emotions and Total Ability EI
Implicit theories of both emotion and EI correlated significantly
with ability EI scores on the MSCEIT. Incremental theories were
associated with higher ability EI. To determine whether theories
of emotions or EI explained a greater proportion of the observed
variance in ability EI, we conducted two analyses of two-step
hierarchical regression to isolate the variance explained by each
scale. The predictor variables were implicit theories of emotions
or EI, while the criterion variable was total ability EI score. In
the first model, we performed regression by adding implicit the-
ories of emotions to the model, followed by implicit theories of
EI. In the second model, the order of addition of the implicit
theories to the model was reversed to control for the variance
explained by implicit theories of EI. Both types of implicit the-
ories explained a relatively small proportion of the variance in
total ability EI. Higher scores in either type of implicit theory
predicted higher total ability EI. In the secondmodel, when implicit
theories of EI were added first to the model, a larger propor-
tion of variance was explained (R2 = 0.07; Table 2). In other
words, theories of EI explained a larger proportion of the total
variance.
Gender and Age Differences in Implicit Theories
of Emotion or EI
In order to investigate O3, we analyzed whether gender and age
were related to implicit theories of emotions and EI. Women
held significantly more incremental theories of emotions than
men [t(432) =  4.99, p < 0.0001, d = 0.36] with a small
effect size, and significantly more incremental theories of EI
[t(432) =  5.91, p < 0.0001, d = 0.50] with a medium effect
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Gender 0:63 0:48 –
2. Age 36:02 14:87  0:23** –
3. Theories of EI 18:92 4:33 0:22** -0.35** –
4. Theories of emotions 19:69 4:61 0:19** -0.27** 0.43** –
5. Ability EI 102:62 12:63 0:19** -0.30** 0.26** 0.21** –
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
TABLE 2 | Regression to predict total ability EI from implicit theories of
either emotion or EI.
Criterion variable b
Step Final
Ability EI
Model 1
Theories of emotions 0.21** 0.12*
Theories of EI 0.21**
R2 0.04** 0.08**
R2 change 0.04**
Model 2
Theories of EI 0.26** 0.21**
Theories of emotions 0.12*
R2 0.07** 0.08**
R2 change 0.01*
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
size. At the same time, women showed significantly higher total
ability EI [t(432) =  4.88, p < 0.0001, d = 0.35] with a small
effect size. Incremental theories of emotions and EI correlated
negatively with age: older adults were less likely than younger ones
to hold incremental theories. Age, in turn, correlated negatively
with ability EI: older people scored lower for total ability EI than
younger adults.
Mediation by Implicit Theories of the Association
of Age or Gender with Total Ability EI
We used a parallel mediation model to explore whether gender
and age were related to total ability EI via implicit theories of
emotions and EI (O4). We used PROCESS Model 4 for parallel
mediation, and all indirect effects were subjected to follow-up
bootstrap analyses with 10,000 bootstrap samples and 95% bias-
corrected CI. In this way, predictor variables (gender and age), the
criterion variable (ability EI) and mediators (implicit theories of
emotions and EI) were tested in a single model.
In Table 3, column a shows the effect of gender or age on the
mediators (implicit theories of emotions and EI); column b, the
effect of implicit theories on the criterion variable (ability EI);
column c, the total effect (direct and indirect) of gender or age on
total ability EI; and column c0, the direct effect of gender or age on
total ability EIwhile controlling implicit theories. The results show
that both types of implicit theories mediated the relationship of
gender and age with total ability EI (Figure 1). The bootstrapped
95% CI confirmed that both types of implicit theories exerted
significant indirect effects on the relationship of gender or age
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TABLE 3 | Implicit theories of emotions or EI as mediators of the relationship of gender or age with total ability EI.
Predictor Criterion Mediator a b c c0 Sobel z 95% CI
Gender Ability EI Theories of emotions 1.804** (0.357) 0.285* (0.111) 4.895** (0.979) 3.293** (0.981) 2.257* [0.146, 1.043]
Theories of EI 1.997** (0.333) 0.544** (0.119) 4.895** (0.979) 3.293** (0.981) 3.602** [0.577, 1.770]
Age Ability EI Theories of emotions  0.083** (0.011) 0.238* (0.110)  0.254** (0.031)  0.191* (0.033) 2.056* [ 0.034,  0.003]
Theories of EI  0.102** (0.010) 0.418** (0.120)  0.254** (0.031)  0.191* (0.033)  3.264** [ 0.070,  0.019]
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the non-standardized B coefficients. Column a shows the coefficient of gender or age in the regression to predict the mediator;
column b, the coefficient of the mediator in the regression to predict the criterion variable; column c, the coefficient of gender or age in the regression to predict the criterion variable;
and column c0, the coefficient of gender or age in the regression to predict the criterion variable while controlling the mediator. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
B
A
FIGURE 1 | Hypothesized parallel mediation model.
with total ability EI. When the combination of gender and both
types of implicit theories was examined, gender accounted for
3.4% of the observed variance in total ability EI; both types of
implicit theories accounted for 6% (overall R2 = 0.094). When
the combination of age and both types of implicit theories was
examined, age accounted for 9% of the observed variance in total
ability EI; both types of implicit theories accounted for 3% (overall
R2 = 0.12).
Discussion
This study is the first to our knowledge that provides evidence that
implicit theories of emotion and EI influence total ability EI on the
MSCEIT, such that incremental theorists show higher ability EI.
This finding is consistent with hypothesis H2 and with previous
studies showing that those who believe they can change their
emotions use effective strategies such as cognitive reappraisal and
mastery-oriented strategies more frequently than individuals who
hold entity theories, and that incremental theorists experience
fewer negative emotions (Tamir et al., 2007; Burnette et al., 2013).
Our finding is also consistent with studies showing that university
students holding incremental theories about intelligence adopt
mastery-oriented strategies to face developmental challenges such
as the start of adolescence and the change from primary school to
high school (Blackwell et al., 2007; Cury et al., 2008).
Our participants perceived implicit theories about both emo-
tion and EI as malleable, and they viewed theories about emotions
as more malleable, consistent with our hypothesis H1. This result
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suggests that people tend to think of emotions as less stable than
EI, consistent with previous work on implicit theories of emotions
and intelligence (Tamir et al., 2007), as well as with widespread
notions of the stability of intelligence (Spinath et al., 2003).
Our data further indicate that implicit theories about emo-
tions and EI, while related, do not overlap and can be separated
from each other. A similar relationship has been reported for
implicit theories of emotion and intelligence (Tamir et al., 2007),
such as when predicting academic and emotional functioning
in adolescents (Romero et al., 2014). Our data suggest that one
key difference between theories of emotions and of EI is that
they appear to influence total ability EI to different extents. We
found that theories of EI explained more of the observed vari-
ance in ability EI than theories of emotions, consistent with our
hypothesis H2.
Motivated in part by the lack of clear evidence for or against
an association of gender or age with implicit theories of emotions
or intelligence, we wanted to examine whether either sociodemo-
graphic variable was associatedwith incremental or entity theories
in our sample (O3). We found that women had more incremental
theories of emotions and EI than men, in accordance with find-
ings from Spinath et al. (2003), but in contrast to several studies
reporting no significant difference between genders (Dweck et al.,
1995a; Tamir et al., 2007; Doron et al., 2009). This discrepancy
may reflect the fact that many previous studies used relatively
young, university-based samples that may not be representative
of the general adult population. In the present study, we analyzed
a sample of 688 adults with ages ranging from18 to 73 years; there-
fore, our results may provide a more valid point of reference than
previous studies. We found that young adults were more likely
than older ones to have incremental theories, which is consistent
with previous work (Spinath et al., 2003). These findings suggest
that women and young adults are more likely to hold incremental
theories than men and older adults.
We found another significant effect of gender and age: women
and young adults in our sample showed higher total ability EI than
men or older individuals. Similar results have been reported in
previous work (Joseph and Newman, 2010; Fernández-Berrocal
et al., 2012; Cabello et al., 2014). This result, together with our
finding that gender and age influence implicit theories of emo-
tions and EI, led us to identify both types of theories as mediators
of the relationship of gender and agewith total ability EI (O4). This
suggests that implicit theories may help to explain the observed
influence of gender and age on ability EI. Even so, implicit theories
explained only 6% of the observed variance in ability EI, while
gender explained only 3.4%. The fact that most variance was
not explained by the factors we examined indicates the existence
of other, more important factors, which should be examined in
future studies. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale against
simplistic interpretations of emotion or EI as being determined
primarily by gender or age.
Our results associating incremental theories about EI with
higher total ability EI extends previous studies linking incre-
mental theories with better academic achievement, more effec-
tive decision-making, and more effortful behavior (Dweck, 1999;
Blackwell et al., 2007). This raises the question of how implicit
theories of EI may influence ability EI. It stands to reason, based
on Dweck’s early research on implicit theories, that people who
believe that EI can be cultivated will be more willing to make
efforts to do so through hard work, appropriate strategies and
seeking help from others. Such individuals may be more likely
to view an emotionally or socially challenging situation not as a
potential danger but as an opportunity for emotional learning and
progress. Future studies should examinewhether and how implicit
theories of EI and ability EI are associated with such real-life
consequences.
These findings may have important implications for interven-
tions with adults. For example, it may be advisable to complement
EI interventions with guided reflection or writing tasks about
the malleability of emotions and EI. This may help ensure that
the subsequent EI intervention has a profound and long-lasting
effect. Previous work has shown that direct and indirect interven-
tions in adolescents and adults can increase incremental beliefs
about intelligence, leading to long-lasting effects (Aronson et al.,
2002; Blackwell et al., 2007). Indeed, training in the malleability
of several human domains, such as emotions, has been shown
to be useful not only for improving academic and professional
performance but also for learning and developing (Dweck et al.,
1995b; Dweck, 2012; Burnette et al., 2013). Our data suggest that
men and older peoplemay benefit in particular from interventions
that target implicit theories of emotions and EI, since these indi-
viduals aremore likely to hold entity theories about these domains.
Developing their incremental beliefs may facilitate improvement
in ability EI. It may be more efficient to target implicit theories
of EI than theories of emotions, since most individuals in our
sample considered EI to be less malleable. Future studies should
explore effectivemethods for integrating interventions to increase
incremental beliefs about EI into training programs. For example,
studies should examine whether interventions to consolidate and
support EI change are more effective when conducted at the
beginning or end of EI-based training.
Limitations and Future Directions
While this study does provide the first evidence linking implicit
theories of emotions and EI with ability EI, its conclusions are
limited in several ways. Its cross-sectional nature and reliance
on a single instrument to assess ability EI preclude inferences
about causality in the relationship between implicit theories and
EI. Our research was inspired by Dweck’s implicit theory and
previous findings suggesting that implicit theories predict distinct
emotional abilities (Burnette et al., 2013; Schumann et al., 2014).
However, our cross-sectional design prevents us from excluding
the possibility of causality in the opposite direction: people with
high EI may gradually develop more incremental theories than
people with low EI. Prospective studies are needed to verify
our mediation results suggesting that incremental theories lead
to higher ability EI. It would be quite interesting to ask, for
example, whether manipulating implicit theories of emotions or
EI durably increases EI functioning. Longitudinal interventional
studies should also test whether training that addresses implicit
theories of EI can lead to better mental and social functioning
than EI training alone. Another limitation of our study is that we
examined only implicit theories of emotions and EI but not several
other variables, such as implicit theories of intelligence, that may
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also contribute to the observed variance in total ability EI. Indeed,
the variables in our model explain only a small proportion of the
variance, suggesting the existence of unidentified factors.
Future work along these lines may provide more insight into
how the association between implicit theories and EI evolves over
a lifetime. Evidence suggests that training in social and emotional
competencies is crucial and should begin in early years and con-
tinue throughout one’s lifetime (Ruiz-Aranda et al., 2012; Rivers
et al., 2013; Kumschick et al., 2014). Future studies should also
examine the relationships between implicit theories of EI and self-
report measures of EI to examine whether they are related to each
other similarly or differently to how they are related to ability EI.
In summary, our findings contribute to the growing liter-
ature on implicit theories and emotional functioning, which
affects quality of life, social adjustment, and professional per-
formance. Incremental theories about intelligence and emotions
have already been shown to contribute to an orientation toward
learning and development (Dweck, 2012; Yeager and Dweck,
2012). Here we illustrate how implicit theories about emotions
and EI are associated with ability EI, softening the impact that
socio-demographic factors such as gender and age may have. This
suggests that manipulating those theories may be useful in EI
training.
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